Les documents de travail contiennent souvent des travaux préliminaires ou partiels et sont circulés pour encourager et stimuler les discussions. Toute citation et référence à ces documents devrait tenir compte de leur caractère provisoire. Les opinions exprimées dans les documents de travail sont ceux de leurs auteurs et ne reflètent pas nécessairement ceux du département des sciences économiques ou de l'ESG. Despite the long literature on endogenous location decisions, the question of how these specifications affect resulting spatial equilibria has not been systematically explored. In this paper we start with workhorse models of QSE based on different specifications of preferences and show that spatial equilibria in those models can be generated using the conditional logit model by McFadden (1974) . Our result suggests that existing models of QSE have a common origin in one of the oldest location choice models.
Introduction
Perhaps the defining characteristic of spatial economics is that agents choose their location endogenously. There are two different strands of literature on endogenous location decisions.
The new economic geography such as Krugman (1991) and Helpman (1998) typically analyzes location choices of homogeneous workers, whereas the conditional logit model by McFadden (1974) consists of a common utility part and an idiosyncratic term, thus allowing consumers to have heterogeneous preferences over different locations.
These seminal works have paved the way for quantitative spatial economics (QSE). As stated by Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017), QSE requires a structural model that combines various components such as preferences, production technology, and frictions for the movement of goods, people, and ideas. Despite the long literature on endogenous location decisions, the question of how the specifications of these components affect resulting spatial equilibria has not been systematically explored.
In this paper we start with one component of first-order importance, namely, preferences, and show that the McFadden (1974) model using idiosyncratic preferences, together with a spatial equilibrium condition, can generate the Helpman (1998) model based on common preferences. 1 Our result sheds new light on QSE, as these two different models have been quantified independently by many authors. For example, the latter model (or its variation)
has been taken to data by Hanson (2005) bution. Hence, these variables can also be the same between the two models if the underlying 1 Unlike the Krugman (1991) model, where the spatial equilibrium involves a corner solution (or full agglomeration in a single region), there are generically no such corner solutions in the Helpman (1998) model. This may explain why the latter has been widely used for quantitative analysis.
assumptions (e.g., production technology, trade costs, etc.) are the same. Furthermore, other things being equal, a shock in fixed costs, trade costs, total population, or the supply of the nontraded good can lead to the same change in the equilibrium spatial distribution of population in both the McFadden (1974) model and the Helpman (1998) model. Thus, these two different models can predict the same quantitative change in equilibrium wages and price indices.
We find that the specification of the common utility part in the McFadden (1974) model is crucial for these results. Indeed, other existing models of QSE can also be generated from the McFadden (1974) model using different specifications of the common utility part. Thus, without loss of generality, we can focus on one of the oldest location choice models, thereby reducing the number of spatial economic models that have to be quantified. Our result is useful Our work is closely related to the literature on product differentiation showing that discrete choice models with heterogeneous agents can generate the same aggregate demand as representative agent models (see Anderson et al., 1992; Thisse and Ushchev, 2016 ). Yet, our paper on location choice is different from the existing work on product choice. In their aggregate demand analysis, representative agents consume all available varieties, whereas heterogeneous agents choose only one variety. In our paper, both representative and heterogeneous consumers choose only one location.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model of common preferences and that of heterogeneous preferences. In Section 3 we compare these two models and derive our main result. Section 4 turns to the related literature, where we deal with other existing models of QSE and discuss the similarities and differences between QSE and aggregate demand analysis. Section 5 concludes.
Models
Consider an economy with R regions, indexed by r = 1, ..., R. Assume that there is a mass L of consumers, each of whom chooses one of the regions and supplies one unit of labor inelastically. We assume that each region is endowed with an exogenous stock of a nontraded good, H r > 0, in perfectly inelastic supply. 2 We start with the Helpman (1998) model with common preferences and then turn to the McFadden (1974) model with idiosyncratic preferences.
Common preferences
Consider the Helpman (1998) model based on common preferences. Let V r = D Each variety is produced by a monopolistically competitive firm that incurs fixed and marginal costs, as well as trade costs, in terms of labor, which is the sole factor of production.
We assume that trade costs have an iceberg form, τ sr , where τ sr > 1 for s ̸ = r and τ sr = 1 for
where w s , m, and F are the wage rate in region s and the marginal and fixed labor requirements, respectively. As a result, the profit-maximizing price is given by
In this setting, a larger population in region r lowers the price index of the traded good
1/(1−σ) and increases the consumption index D r because consumers purchase a greater range of local varieties without incurring trade costs. Thus, the presence 2 The nontraded good is interpreted as housing in Helpman (1998) or amenity in Redding and Strum (2008) .
of the traded good induces an agglomeration force. In contrast, a larger L r reduces the consumption of the nontraded good h r , which generates a dispersion force. The relative strength of the agglomeration and dispersion forces is governed by the expenditure share µ.
The location choice problem of the representative agent is given by max r=1,...,R {V r }. The consumption index D r is positive and finite for all regions as long as trade costs are finite.
Since H r is also positive and finite, we have lim Lr→0 V r = ∞, which implies that each region attracts at least some population. Thus, with finite trade costs and with the expenditure share being µ ∈ (0, 1), it follows that V r = V s for any r and s ̸ = r. Hence, in such a case, the spatial equilibrium is defined as the population distribution {L r } R r=1 satisfying
In the extreme case where µ goes to zero, consumers choose a location based solely on the consumption of the differentiated good. Since the price index is lower in the larger region, all consumers end up in a single region. However, in the other extreme case where µ goes to one, consumers care only about the consumption of the nontraded good, which leads to the equalization of H r /L r across regions.
In what follows we relate (1) to the spatial equilibrium condition based on the McFadden (1974) model of location choice.
Idiosyncratic preferences
Consider the McFadden (1974) model of idiosyncratic preferences. Let V ℓ r = U r + ε ℓ r denote the utility of agent ℓ from choosing region r, where U r and ε ℓ r are the common utility part and the idiosyncratic term that follows a Gumbel distribution with zero mean and variance equal to π 2 β 2 /6. The choice probability of region r is then given by
the extreme case where β goes to zero, consumers choose the region with the highest U r with probability one. However, in the other extreme case where β goes to infinity, the choice probability becomes P r = 1/R for all r, regardless of the distribution {U r } R r=1 . Thus, β governs the dispersion force, like the expenditure share µ for the nontraded good in the case of common preferences.
In the case of idiosyncratic consumers, the spatial equilibrium {L r } R r=1 is given by the condition that the choice probability of region r equals the population share of region r as follows (see Murata, 2003 ; Kline and Moretti, 2014; Behrens et al., 2017):
Taking the ratio between regions r and s ̸ = r, the spatial equilibrium condition implies that
In what follows, we compare the two spatial equilibrium conditions: expression (4) based on idiosyncratic preferences; and expression (1) based on common preferences.
Comparison

Spatial equilibrium
We have so far derived the two spatial equilibrium conditions (1) and (4). Since the right-hand side is identical in both expressions, the spatial equilibrium condition (4) using the McFadden 
The foregoing expression is satisfied if
where κ > 0 is a constant. Hence, we can establish the following proposition. 
Welfare
Even when the McFadden (1974) model and the Helpman (1998) model generate the same spatial equilibrium, the welfare change driven by some shock can be different for the following reasons. First, since V r = V s holds for any r and s ̸ = r in the Helpman (1998) 
Note that the last equality is obtained from (5) 
holds for all s = 1, ..., R, so that
where L = R s=1 L s is the total population. Recalling that V * denotes the equilibrium utility in the Helpman (1998) model, the expected equilibrium utility in the McFadden (1974) model can be rewritten as
Note that when κ = 1 and β = µ, the foregoing expression can be simplified as follows:
which is different from the equilibrium utility V * in the Helpman (1998) model.
As seen from (7), except that V * is log-transformed, the (expected) equilibrium utility in the Helpman (1998) model and the expected equilibrium utility in the McFadden (1974) model differ by β ln L, conditional on the same spatial equilibrium. This difference depends on the size of the economy L and the 'degree of taste heterogeneity' β.
Thus, for the same positive shock to population L in both models, utility increases less in the Helpman (1998) model. The reason is that the consumption of the nontraded good is congestible in the Helpman (1998) model, i.e., V r and thus V * depend on h r = H r /L r .
However, it is not congestible in the McFadden (1974) model, i.e., U r depends on H r as can be seen from Proposition 1. Hence, even though both models generate the same change in the equilibrium allocation, their welfare implications are different.
Last, when κ = 1 and β = µ, we can rewrite (6) as follows
where U * r is the common utility part in the McFadden (1974) model evaluated at equilibrium, and where L denotes the average population size of the R regions, so that L = RL. As one can see, if L r = L for all r, i.e., all regions have the same size, then the utility increases in the number of regions R. This is a standard feature of discrete choice models, where the utility is increasing in the range of the choice set.
Related literature
In this section, we deal with other existing models of QSE and discuss the similarities and differences between QSE and aggregate demand analysis.
Armington model
Allen and Arkolakis (2014) develop a model of QSE based on Armington (1969) . In their model, the utility function is specified as V r = D r H r L − µ r . The spatial equilibrium condition is then given by
where the right-hand side is the same as that of (4). Thus, the spatial equilibrium condition 
where κ > 0. Hence, we can establish the following proposition. 
Fréchet model
We have so far considered the McFadden (1974) model, i.e., the additively separable model, 
so that the spatial equilibrium is given by
Taking the ratio between regions r and s, the spatial equilibrium condition implies that
where the right-hand side is the same as that of (4). Thus, the spatial equilibrium condition (4) based on the Gumbel distribution boils down to the spatial equilibrium condition (9) based on the Fréchet distribution when
where κ > 0 is a constant. Hence, we can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume that U r = β ln κ+(β/ β) ln U r . Then, the spatial equilibrium condition 
Aggregate demand analysis
We have so far considered the location choice problem. consume an identical set of varieties, whereas heterogeneous agents consume a different variety.
For these reasons, our result is different from the relationship between the CES and the logit in the existing literature on industrial organization.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have shown that the conditional logit model by McFadden (1974) , together with a spatial equilibrium condition, can generate workhorse models of QSE based on various specifications of preferences. Our result suggests that existing models of QSE have a common origin rooted in one of the oldest location choice models. This result is useful since there are too many models of QSE to quantify all of them. It also allows us to sharpen the quantitative analysis by indicating when different models of QSE yield the same quantitative results.
